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 Crime Control, Due Process, & Evidentiary Exclusion:       
When Exceptions Become the Rule 
 
Elizabeth H. Kaylor 
CUNY John Jay College 
__________________________________________________________________ 
This paper uses the dichotomy between Herbert Packer’s (1968) two models of            
criminal justice advocacy—“crime control” and “due process”—as a rhetorical         
paradigm for understanding policy debate about the exclusion of relevant evidence           
at trial. Understanding the opposition between crime control and due process           
advocates as a rhetorical controversy, in which commonly-used ideographs         
camouflage dramatically different constructions of the concepts at stake, helps to           
illuminate the way each side mobilizes public support for their narrative of doing.             
While both the exclusionary rule (which prohibits the use of illegally-obtained           
evidence in criminal cases) and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine (which             
expands this rule) have been partially dismantled, they have not been abolished,            
and each remains a significant and productive locus of the debate over what values              
should inform the criminal justice process. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
In a nation where political rhetoric resounds with promises to “get tough on crime,” those                             
calling for tougher measures often find themselves pitted against civil liberties advocates                       
in policy debates. This division is best understood through the application of a model of                             
criminal justice advocacy developed by Herbert Packer (1968). Packer distinguishes                   
between advocates of a “crime control” model for justice and those advocating a model                           
which calls instead for “due process.” Curiously, though Packer’s dichotomy functions as                       
a rhetorical paradigm for understanding the kinds of arguments found in criminal justice                         
debates, and though this paradigm is frequently discussed in the criminal justice field, it has                             
not been widely applied in communication analysis of criminal justice issues. This paper                         
attempts to show its utility as a vehicle for assessing arguments about the exclusionary                           
rule, which prohibits the use of illegally­obtained evidence in criminal cases, and the “fruit                           
of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which expands this rule. 
The crime control and due process models represent two competing value systems which                         
may be encoded in the criminal process to varying degrees (Packer, 1968). They also                           
characterize two distinct worldviews which shape competing arguments in the criminal                     
justice realm. In this way, crime control and due process are ideological filters for                           
constructing narratives about the best way to do justice in this country. The debate                           
between advocates of crime control and advocates of due process can be understood                         
through an analysis of rhetorical controversy. The position of each faction rests on an                           
understanding of justice that is wholly inconsistent with the interests and definitions of the                           
opposing side. In policy debates, both groups rely on the use of ideographs in order to                               
justify their recommendations (McGee, 1980a). The ideal types embodied by the two                       
models serve as guideposts to compare perspectives on real­life issues, such as the                         
exclusionary rule and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. Developed in a climate of                             
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 civil liberties concerns, these principles have been partially dismantled through a series of                         
crime­control­oriented rulings. Yet they have not been abolished, and in fact remain a                         
significant and productive locus of debate over the values that should inform the criminal                           
process. 
The Doctrines 
Packer (1968)’s influential dichotomy between crime control and due process values can                       
be applied to a vast array of criminal justice policy debates, from the necessity of                             
mandatory minimum sentencing laws to the appropriateness of educational programming                   
in prisons and jails. However, tension surfaces between these differing perspectives as                       
early as the evidence collection phase of a criminal investigation, which inevitably                       
becomes a central concern during the adversarial courtroom process. The United States                       
Constitution works in tandem with a precedent­based body of collected jurisprudence to                       
provide a blueprint for what evidence is acceptable for the prosecution to present at trial.                             
Two crucial judicial doctrines underpin all legal decisions regarding the inclusion and                       
exclusion of evidence in criminal cases: the exclusionary rule, and an extension of this rule                             
known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. 
The exclusionary rule and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine are judicial principles                           
that stem from the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees “[t]he right of the                       
people…against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the due process clause of the                       
Fifth Amendment, which holds that “no person…[may] be deprived of life, liberty, or                         
property, without due process of law” (U.S. Constitution). The exclusionary rule was                       
designed to prevent the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained in violation of a                         
defendant’s Constitutional rights (Teague, 1982). Boyd v. U.S. (1886) was the first                       
American judicial case to exclude evidence on grounds implicating the Fourth Amendment                       
(Schroeder, 1981). According to the Court, asking Boyd to produce personal invoices as                         
evidence violated his Fifth Amendment rights by compelling him to be a witness against                           
himself (Boyd v. U.S., 1886). The Court also held that the search and seizure of private                               
papers was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment (Boyd v. U.S., 1886).  
Twenty­eight years later came Weeks v. U.S. (1914), wherein the defendant’s private                       
correspondence was seized by police without a warrant. The Court stated that the                         
protection of the Fourth Amendment must be respected by those enforcing federal laws                         
(Weeks v. U.S., 1914). The Weeks decision was important because the Court relied                         
exclusively on the Fourth Amendment for its judgment, and emphasized not only the                         
nature of the evidence but the manner in which it was seized (Schroeder, 1981). In Amos                               
v. U.S. (1921), the Court extended the exclusionary rule beyond private papers.                       
Thereafter, the Court focused on the manner in which evidence was obtained rather than                           
the nature of the evidence (Schroeder, 1981).  
By 1928, the Court held that it was constitutionally required to exclude most evidence                           
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; however, this applied only to individuals                         
acting under federal authority (Schroeder, 1981). It was not until Mapp v. Ohio (1961)                           
that the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the exclusionary rule also applied to the states’                             
prosecution of state crimes. When obscene literature was seized during an illegal search                         
of the defendant’s residence, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed her conviction for                       
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 possessing lewd material on the basis that the Fourth Amendment did not forbid the                           
admission of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure in state prosecutions                       
of state crimes (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state                           
court’s decision, closing “the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by                         
official lawlessness” (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961). 
Left open, however, was the question of whether or not evidence obtained indirectly from                           
a rights violation should also be excluded. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine,                           
declaring evidence inadmissible when the defendant can demonstrate a causal connection                     
between the evidence and a prior rights violation (Maguire, 1964), was first espoused in                           
1920 in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S. The government admitted that it had erred in                             
illegally seizing company papers, but desired to use knowledge gained from those papers                         
to frame and evidence a new indictment against the company (Silverthorne Lumber Co.                         
v. U.S., 1920). However, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits not only the illegal                             
seizure of evidence, but also all evidence resulting from it (Bain & Kelly, 1977). The “fruit                               
of the poisonous tree” doctrine extended the exclusionary rule to all evidence discovered                         
because of a rights violation (Maguire, 1964). The exclusionary rule thus expanded over                         
time to include “virtually any kind of evidence” unlawfully obtained by government agents                         
(Teague, 1982, p. 635). 
Due Process Support 
The exclusionary rule and the “poisonous tree” doctrine are supported by advocates of the                           
due process model, which espouses high evidentiary standards and the primacy of                       
individual rights (Packer, 1966). By 1965, the Court had articulated a number of reasons                           
for evidentiary exclusion (Schroeder, 1981). These had two primary foci—the rights of                       
the individual against whom the illegally seized evidence would be admitted and the                         
societal interests promoted by evidentiary exclusion, specifically, the importance of                   
securing judicial integrity and deterring illegal police actions (Schroeder, 1981). These                     
concerns are representative of the liberal position of the 1953–1969 Supreme Court under                         
Chief Justice Warren, which exemplified due process values (Ball, 1978; Kamisar, 2003;                       
Thaman, 2010).  
The justifications for a robust exclusionary rule emphasize the rights of the accused. For                           
due process advocates, the interests of society are served not by an efficient criminal                           
process, as with the crime control model, but by ensuring that the process does not                             
impinge upon the “dignity and autonomy of the individual” (Packer, 1966, p. 239).                         
Because the combination of stigma and loss of liberty that may result from the criminal                             
process is considered the ultimate deprivation that the government can impose, the                       
criminal process must be judicial and adversarial, forcing the prosecution to fight at every                           
stage to prove the legal guilt of the defendant (Packer, 1966). Due process values                           
therefore demand the creation and enforcement of laws which protect citizens from                       
improper searches and seizures, and from any advantages gained over them as a result                           
(Kaplan, 1974).  
The due process world view is compelling in its evocation of values of freedom and                             
autonomy, values which are enshrined in the American imagination. In due process                       
rhetoric, freedom and autonomy are ideographs, or virtue words, defined by McGee                       
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 (1980a) as “ordinary language term[s]…[which] represent…commitment to a particular                 
but equivocal and ill­defined normative goal” (p. 15). Ideographs commonly appear in                       
political discourse as explanations or justifications intended to strengthen public support for                       
a particular political position or action (McGee, 1980a; Sandmann, 1996). Although                     
ideographs provide the illusion of specificity, their mutability between contexts furnishes                     
them with an essential ambiguity that is the root of their rhetorical power (McGee, 1980a).                             
Crime control supporters do not claim to devalue freedom or autonomy; rather, due to the                             
abstract and individualized nature of these concepts, they are able use the same                         
ideographs to appeal to a different subset of the community while implying normative                         
consensus.  
Crime Control Criticism 
The crime control position on the exclusionary rule was summarized in People v. DeFore                           
(1926), where Judge Cardozo famously asked “[s]hould the criminal go free because the                         
constable has blundered?” This same sentiment was articulated by Chief Justice Burger in                         
his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971).                       
Justice Burger argued that any potential benefits of the exclusionary rule did not outweigh                           
“the high price it exacts from society—the release of countless guilty criminals.” Burger’s                         
statement embodies the central concern of crime control advocates with regards to                       
evidentiary exclusion. This is a compelling argument, drawing upon fear and a sense of                           
injustice to provoke a strong emotional response. 
The crime control model emphasizes truth­seeking and administrative efficiency and                   
prioritizes factual guilt over legal guilt (Packer, 1968). From a crime control viewpoint,                         
allowing guilty persons to go free is the ultimate failing of the criminal process (Packer,                             
1968). The crime control model accepts errors as a consequence of efficiency insofar as                           
they do not interfere with the goal of repressing crime by allowing guilty persons to go                               
free or damaging the reputation of the justice system to the degree that the deterrent                             
effects of the law are diminished (Packer, 1968). Markman (1997) argues that the                         
exclusionary rule is responsible for “releasing the obviously guilty…permitting juries to be                       
misled…and…[the] tolerance of false testimony” (p. 431). These so­called “crummy                   
technicalities” have undermined the integrity of the criminal process such that the                       
government cannot preserve the people’s right to freedom from predators (Markman,                     
1997, p. 431). Crime control advocates believe that when criminals go unpunished, social                         
disorganization and loss of social freedom inevitably follow (Packer, 1968). From a crime                         
control perspective, the implied meaning of autonomy has nothing to do with protecting                         
individuals against the tyranny of the state; rather, freedom is equated with undiminished                         
safety for the law­abiding citizens of the community. 
This directly opposes the view articulated in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) that “[t]he criminal                           
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a                                   
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws.” These opposing                         
conceptions of freedom bear a striking resemblance to the alternative meanings of liberty                         
identified by McGee (1980b). To illustrate the multiplicity of meanings in an ideograph,                         
McGee (1980b) retells the anecdote of Antun Robecick, a Gary, Indiana steelworker who                         
emigrated to his native Yugoslavia after retiring. Perhaps unexpectedly, Robecick is                     
unable to judge which country has more freedom: Yugoslavia is a totalitarian regime                         
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 controlled by a sole man, yet he felt safe to walk its streets alone at night (McGee, 1980b;                                   
Sandmann, 1996). In contrast, Robecick had freedom of thought and speech in the United                           
States, but feared for his safety and felt like a prisoner in his own house (McGee, 1980b;                                 
Sandmann, 1996). Having experienced firsthand both conditions, and understood both as                     
manifestations of his relative freedom, Robecick was the unique position of seeing the true                           
ambiguity of an ideograph. To those entrenched in a crime control or due process                           
worldview, however, only one meaning is visible. 
Here, the rhetorical controversy over the meaning of justice—another ideograph central to                       
the debate between crime control and due process proponents—becomes especially clear.                     
McGee (1980a) emphasizes that, at any specific moment in history, all ideographs are                         
synchronically connected to each other like brain cells linked by synapses. Justice                       
therefore is informed by understandings of freedom and autonomy and vice versa. From                         
a due process standpoint, violations of the procedural integrity of the criminal process                         
inflict greater harm on society than “lost” convictions (Packer, 1968). This is evident in                           
the privileging of legal, procedurally­determined guilt over factual guilt (Packer, 1968).                     
Opposing Markman (1997), Thaman (2010) argues that the security of the populace is                         
most threatened when law enforcement agents are able to achieve convictions even when                         
they violate citizens’ rights in the process. It is not the criminal going free that threatens                               
social disorder and injustice, but the government overstepping its bounds (Packer, 1968).                       
Thus, it is not a “terrible cost” when criminal convictions are forfeited due to constitutional                             
violations (Thaman, 2010, p. 384). Due process advocates emphasize the victimless nature                       
of many of the crimes in cases where convictions are “lost” due to evidentiary exclusion,                             
usually involving the suppression of drugs or other “harmless” evidence (e.g. Kamisar,                       
2003; Kaplan, 1974; Schroeder, 1981; Thaman, 2010). Conversely, crime control                   
advocates condemn evidentiary exclusion for allowing killers, rapists, and other violent                     
criminals to unjustly go free (e.g. Brown, 1982; Markman, 1997; Kaplan, 1974; Wilkey,                         
1979).  
From a crime control perspective, the criminal process should be principally concerned                       
with factual guilt (Packer, 1968). Supporters of a crime control model see the                         
exclusionary rule as a distortion of the truth insofar as it suppresses “undeniable facts” by                             
excluding material evidence that indicates factual guilt on the part of the defendant                         
(Markman, 1977; Schroeder, 1981; Wilkey, 1979, p. 222). Crime control advocates may                       
support the exclusion of evidence of questionable reliability, such as coerced confessions                       
(Wilkey, 1979), because these errors jeopardize the reputation of the criminal process and                         
damage its deterrent effects (Packer, 1968). However, they are resolutely opposed to                       
most cases of evidentiary exclusion, arguing that the rules are unnecessary for the truly                           
innocent and only protect guilty persons (Markman, 1997; Wilkey, 1979). 
The Exceptions to the Rule(s) 
Following the Warren Court’s establishment of a robust exclusionary rule, the Supreme                       
Court has limited its use via an increasing number of exceptions (Kamisar, 2003; Mertens                           
& Wasserstrom, 1981). This erosion reflects the adoption of crime control values by the                           
Court. The due process counterargument is illustrated by Justice Brennan’s dissent in                       
U.S. v. Havens (1980), where the Court ruled that the impeachment of the defendant                           
using illegally­seized evidence did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights                     
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 (Teague, 1982). Decrying this new exception to the exclusionary rule, Brennan asserted                       
that “what is important is that the Constitution does not countenance police misbehavior,                         
even in the pursuit of truth” (U.S. v. Havens, 1980). However, in keeping with calls for                               
convictions based on truth, or factual guilt (e.g. Markman, 1997; Wiley 1979), the Court                           
began prioritizing the efficient functioning of the criminal process above civil liberties                       
concerns. 
The Supreme Court’s adoption of a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule stands                           
as one of the most significant retreats from the exclusionary rule as originally established.                           
Since 1974, members of the Court advocated the adoption of an exception mandating that                           
evidence would not be excluded on the basis of rights violations in cases where law                             
enforcement agents acted under a reasonable, good­faith belief that their actions were                       
constitutional (Ball, 1978). In Fourth Amendment cases, most good faith violations involve                       
failure to meet probable cause requirements (Ball, 1978). An officer may make a “good                           
faith mistake,” believing that the facts constitute probable cause, or commit a “technical                         
violation” by relying upon a statute, warrant, or precedent which is later invalidated (Ball,                           
1978, p. 635).  
U.S. v. Williams (1980), wherein the United States Court of Appeals adopted a good faith                             
exception to the exclusionary rule, represents what Justice Brennan termed its “slow                       
strangulation” (Brown, 1982, p. 660). The court ruled that when the exclusion of evidence                           
is sought because police misconduct led to its discovery, the evidence should still be                           
admitted when the conduct, even “if mistaken or unauthorized, was yet taken in a                           
reasonable, good­faith belief that it was proper” (U.S. v. Williams, 1980). The court                         
justified this exception on the basis that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter                               
police misconduct; thus, excluding evidence when the police acted rightly is unnecessary                       
(Brown, 1982; Mertens & Wasserstrom, 1981).  
The Supreme Court applied the good faith exception four years later in U.S. v. Leon et                               
al. (1984), where it held that evidence seized in reasonable, good­faith reliance on a                           
search warrant which was subsequently invalidated should not be barred from admission.                       
Subsequent decisions were premised on the understanding that Leon supported a                     
categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for police misconduct contingent on clerical                       
errors (e.g. Arizona v. Isaacs, 1995).  
Herring v. U.S. (2009) may be said to represent a “sea change” in exclusionary rule                             
jurisprudence, as it was the first case to take the mental state of the police into account                                 
(Posner, 2009). By holding that an officer’s actions must exceed mere negligence,                       
Herring paved the way for further expansion of the good faith exception (Herring v.                           
U.S., 2009). In Davis v. U.S. (2011), the Court again ruled that the reasonable, good­faith                             
actions of law enforcement precluded the exclusion of evidence. The Court further stated                         
that the exclusionary rule applies only when “police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly                         
negligent” disregard for the Fourth Amendment (Davis v. U.S., 2011). Justices Breyer                       
and Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the good faith exception would soon swallow the                         
exclusionary rule entirely (Davis v. U.S., 2011). This may not be an unwelcome                         
development for the Court, however, which has long exercised its discretion in serious                         
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 cases to stretch legal doctrine and hold dubious searches and seizures legal (Kaplan,                         
1974). 
The Court carved out a number of similar exceptions for the “fruit of the poisonous tree”                               
doctrine. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), the Court stated that                         
illegally­obtained facts could still be admitted if knowledge of them was garnered from an                           
independent source. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution, who must convince the                           
court that the evidence is independent of the unlawful act (Maguire, 1964). In Nardone v.                             
U.S. (1939), the Court established a second exception, that of attenuation (Bain & Kelly,                           
1977). According to the majority, the prosecution may argue that the connection between                         
the initial violation and the derived evidence has become “so attenuated as to dissipate the                             
taint” of illegality (Nardone v. U.S., 1939). In Wong Sun v. U.S. (1961), the Court                             
restated the attenuation exception, but their language has been used to support another                         
exception, which applies where the government “undoubtedly would have (probably would                     
have) (could have) (might have) lawfully discovered the ‘tainted’ evidence” through legal                       
means (Kamisar, LaFave, & Israe, 1974, qtd. in Bain & Kelly, 1977, p. 625). This                             
“independent discovery” exception is the most nebulous and controversial of the                     
“poisonous tree” exceptions (Bain & Kelly, 1977). 
Crime Control Support 
Crime control proponents support these exceptions; even those who argue for the                       
complete abolition of the exclusionary rule believe that caveats, particularly the good faith                         
exception, mitigate its worst qualities (Markman, 1997). One criticism of the exclusionary                       
rule prior to U.S. v. Williams (1980) was that it failed to discriminate between “grossly                             
willful” police misconduct and errors made under the best possible judgment (Wilkey,                       
1979, p. 226). The good faith exception prevents the most egregious cases of criminals                           
going free due to minor violations (Brown, 1982) and increases the efficiency of the                           
criminal process in a manner consistent with crime control goals by protecting the use of                             
probative evidence in judicial fact­finding (Ball, 1978). The exceptions of independence,                     
attenuation, and inevitability that mitigate the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine similarly                         
boost judicial discretion and make it less likely that evidence will be excluded. 
Nonetheless, many crime control advocates view the exclusionary rule and “poisonous                     
tree” doctrine as fundamentally detrimental to the criminal process. Like other procedural                       
requirements associated with due process, the mandatory exclusion of evidence “fosters                     
perjury, consumes valuable judicial resources, and contributes to court delays” (Schroeder,                     
1981, p. 1383), hampering crime control premiums on speed and finality (Packer, 1968).                         
These hurdles allow innocent defendants to languish in jail and dangerous individuals                       
pending trial to remain free (Schroeder, 1981). This contravenes the crime control                       
objective of quickly screening out the innocent and rapidly securing the convictions of the                           
guilty, which ultimately contravenes the primary goal of justice as conceptualized by                       
crime control supporters (Packer, 1968). The exclusionary rule distracts from the crucial                       
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 Due Process Concerns 
From a due process perspective, however, the diminishing strength of the exclusionary                       
rule and its “poisonous tree” extension is a cause for concern. Kamisar (2003) suggests                           
that “nowadays the criminal only ‘goes free’ if…the constable has blundered badly” (p.                         
133). Indeed, the blunder must now demonstrate “deliberate, reckless, or grossly                     
negligent” disregard for the Fourth Amendment (Davis v. U.S., 2011). Limiting the                       
exclusionary rule to bad faith violations might encourage police to engage in unlawful                         
conduct with the belief that the courts will forgive all but the most egregious behavior                             
(Kaplan, 1974; Schroeder, 1981). Likewise, the gradual undermining of the “poisonous                     
tree” doctrine, achieved by balancing the seriousness of the unlawful act with the                         
connection between the act and the derivative evidence (Thaman, 2010), has increased                       
opportunities for the prosecution to convict based on rights­violating evidence. Because                     
the stigma and deprivation of liberty that result from criminal convictions are so severe,                           
due process advocates argue that this represents a greater risk to public security, or                           
autonomy, than “lost” convictions (Packer, 1968; Thaman, 2010). Thaman (2010) asserts                     
that each time a (non­violent) defendant escapes the “Draconian punishment” of the U.S.                         
through a successful suppression motion, it is “a plus for humanity and human rights” (p.                             
384). Like the crime control argument that evidentiary exclusion will improperly excuse                       
guilty persons, this rhetoric draws upon Americans’ desire for justice in criminal                       
procedure, positing instead that U.S. criminal sanctions are so unduly harsh as to make                           
“failure” preferable to conviction in cases of unconstitutional prosecution. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are hallmarks                           
of the due­process­oriented Warren Court. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have                   
focused more on expeditious crime control, dismantling these exclusionary rules through                     
proliferating exceptions. However, despite calls for their abolition, the principles have not                       
been weakened to the point of disintegration. In fact, evidentiary exclusion remains a                         
fruitful catalyst for important debates over what values should inform criminal justice                       
policy. As Packer (1968) emphasized, crime control and civil liberties protection are not                         
mutually exclusive; both goals coexist in the contemporary criminal process as they did in                           
the heyday of the Warren Court. Examining old tensions and exploring new areas of                           
dispute are crucial for understanding and improving the criminal process and ensuring the                         
security of society at large. Packer’s two models provide the foundation for the                         
arguments presented in debates between advocates for broader law enforcement powers                     
and those demanding greater protection of human rights against state encroachment.                     
Understanding the opposition between crime control and due process advocates as a                       
rhetorical controversy, in which commonly­used ideographs camouflage dramatically               
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